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Abstract: This article identifies an inliuilt detect oi rnotieni Physics. It consists in not providing enough connection lietweeii the
two bodies of knowledge that make up Physics; observations of and experiments with material things, on the one hand, and
niatheriiatical theories, on the other. More specifically, the ddect consists in that mathernatical structures are applied to
experiences oi the material world, as it they were only in the mind oi the physicist. Nevertheless, the success or rnatheruarieal
Physics suggests that these mathematical structures are somehow related to the material realities they are applied to. — Due to
the inbuilt detect, rnatheniatical theories in Physics have to undergo ii procedure oi approval or disapproval by experiments.
However, even if approved, the hypothetical character of such a theory cannot be removed. A theory never hecornes definitive.
— The roots of the said defect lie in the scientific revolution during the 16th and 17“ centuries. This article makes three of them
explicit: (i) the dominant View that Nature and human cognitive capacities do not fit together, (ii) most present day ways of
understanding Mathematics do not involve the material world, a.iid (n the scientific revolution has essentially brought, for
Physics, its niatliernatizaticn. — It is proposed that lhoniistic hyloniorphisni is a suitable tool to show how those mathematical
structures that are used in Physics have their root in material things themselves. The “application" of mathematical structures to
experiences oi the material world thus has an ohjeetive foundation. The lielongiiig oi niathernatical structures to material things is
based on that the hylomorphic structure unites organically the singularity of a material thing and its belonging to a species. —
Christianity does not endorse any particular solution of that problem. However, Christianity contributes to a solution insofar it
supports strongly the genuine intelligibility of our world. Tire spirit of ciirisri
realist lcnawledgc.
thus supports the view of science as a son oi
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This article focuses on the problem which is commonly called the ‘ question of applicability of
Mathematics in Physics’. As a result, a work programme is suggested for elaborating the View that
certain mathematical structures stem somehow from material things. Therefore, these structures
cannot be said to be ‘ applied’ to material things, as if Mathematics were something alien to them.
We begin by exposing certain basic features of the so called scientific revolution of the 16”" and
17"‘ centuries, identify certain problems caused by that revolution and formulate the work
programme accordingly. A Chinese reader might particularly notice that the work programme
attempts to get the different parts of the problem into a harmonious relationship among each other.
It must be stressed that this problem is completely independent of any religious views.
Nevertheless, it is Christianity that strongly encourages scientific and philosophical inquiry by
affirming the deep intelligibility of this world. In other words, Christianity is intrinsically science -
friendly. This will be briefly discussed in the last section of this article.
The root of modern Physics lies in the philosophy of nature as it has been shaped in antiquity
by the Greeks. Their philosophical reflections always were based on observations and brought about
' change‘ and ' cause’. Much later, approximately in the 14”the notions of ‘ substance ’ ,
century, another type of knowledge expressed in numbers, numerical proportions and other
mathematical structures joined the existent philosophy of nature. About two centuries later, the
interplay of these two branches of knowledge underwent a revolutionary change. The mathematical
models of material reality had become sufficiently sophisticated that their predictions called for
experiments as the tool for testing them. Eventually the tandem lexperiment & theoryl prevailed
over mere observation.
Accordingly, mathematical theories in Physics became more and more dominant and tranformed
Physics into something like a comet with a theoretical core and an experimental tail. At the same
time, theory drifted away from experimental Physics. An example for how far this went is the
characterization of the relationship between mathematical theory and material nature given by the
physicist H. ‘,7 Hertz (1857 -1894). According to Hertz, we make ourselves mathematical pictures
or symbols of natural things in such a way that the mathematical consequences of the pictures also
yield a picture of the natural development or behaviour of the corresponding natural things. This is
the only feature that makes them symbols of material things. Therefore. it is possible that there are
many suitable mathematical models or formulations of laws of nature®.
The thinness of the link between the experienced physical reality and its mathematical model
goes hand in hand, surprisingly, with the breathtaking success of mathematical models in Physics.
It is as if the physical science of the last three centuries has finally discovered mathematical
® I-Ienz. H. . The Pmwrplcs ofMe£harIirJ, Pruer-led in a New Form. London: Macmillan 1899; lmmducuon. Reprints New York:
Dover P|Iblicat'ions1956; Mincula, I\. Y. , Dover 2003.
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structures as the intelligible core of nature. Then it almost became a necessity that the cognitive
value of experience was estimated lower and lower, while the trust into the cognitive value of
mathematical models was increasingly appreciated. The influence of contemporary philosophy
fostered the conviction that nature does not release its secrets and that, therefore, the scientist has
to furnish himself a picture of nature. Eventually, experience - observations and experiments -
ceased to be considered as a source of theories. Instead, human genius became considered as
inventor of theories, which made experience comprehensible.
Then, the conclusion can hardly be avoided that both experience and theories remain two
bodies of knowledge independent of each other. Their juncture takes place, according to most
physicists, only in the physicist’ s mind. In other words, it is excluded that mathematical theories
in Physics are rooted in one or other way in the material things they refer to. Accordingly, they are
not extracted somehow from the observer ‘ s or experimenter ’ s experience. Application of
mathematical structures is something exogene to material things, while extraction is something
endogene.
In the former case, the success of physico — mathematical theories would be due to the internal
organisation of the physicist’ s cognitive (and maybe other) capacities only. In the case of
‘extraction’ , it would be due also to reality. Success as well as lack of success takes place in
physical processes and is measured in terms of fitting predictions (and efficient technology). That
means that success is not something purely theoretical, but requires some practice, experimental as
well as adapting mathematical tools to an experimental situation. Thought experiments are not
sufficient.
It is very significant that dealing jointly with experimental data and theoretical concepts is
anything but a straightforward procedure. Rather, physicists make certain mathematical hypotheses
motivated somehow by observational or experimental data, try to apply them to certain natural
phenomena and then, based on that application, elaborate an approval or disapproval of the
hypotheses in question. It seems that the hypothetical character of the application of mathematical
theories to material things is considered to be unremovable. There is no evidence either that such a
removal is considered necessary or beneficial for Physics. Physicists seem to be satisfied with a mere
interlocking of both experience and theory, instead of an organic connection also rooted in physical
reality than merely in the physicist’ s mind.
are
The situation sketched above suggests we put the question of whether such mathematical
structures stem from the material things they refer to and, therefore, can somehow be extracted from
observational or experimental data about these very same things.
This article’ s contribution to answer that question develops in two steps; after having supplied
some more details about the interlocking of experience and mathematical knowledge (section II. ) ,
we present as a first step three ideas that have been shaped during the scientific revolution and have
been highly influential in bringing about present day Physics.
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The first pivotal idea is that the View about the intelligibility of this world has been
“pessimistic" for centuries (III.
selfunderstanding does not involve any reference to the material world (IV. ). Third, the scientific
revolution has brought, for Physics, essentially its mathematization (V. ). And, due to the way of
its historical performance, the mathematization has brought about several problems within Physics
(VI.
The second step offers some considerations about an agenda of overcoming these divisions
(VII. ). The main idea is to return to the unity of reality expressed by what could be called the
metaphysical principle of no — contradiction. This in turn requires a thorough recourse to
experience. This in turn requires positively taking into account every single material thing, and
negatively to leave unused the known physico — mathematical theories. It is suggested to use, as an
appropriate philosophical tool, the key notion of Thomistic philosophy of nature, namely
hylomorphism. Among other things, hylomorphism gives a certain account of the singularity of each
material thing.
Christianity has no stance with respect to any particular solution of this problem. Yet
Christianity settles a general frame for more successfully attempting its solution. This is so because
Christianity supports the conviction of the intelligibility of this world , and conversely that the human
mind is capable of understanding this world (VIII. ). This holds despite of limitations and the
possibility of errors of the human mind.
II . The progressive character of the mathematization of Physics
Listening to what physicists say about their own science provides deeper acquaintance with the
intellectual climate in Physics. We confine ourselves here to quoting short statements about the
relationship between Mathematics and material things of four representative physicists of the 20"‘
century. They essentially agree irrespective of their different philosphical backgrounds.
First, Albert Einstein; The world of experience and the world of concepts are united in the
same person, but experiences do not influence the shaping of concepts and vice versa. Therefore it
is possible that “ all concepts, even those which are closest to experience, are from the point of logic
freely chosen conventions, just as is the case with the concept of causality. "@And even more
explicitly; “The theoretical attitude here advocated is distinct from that of Kant only by the fact that
we do not conceive of the “categories" as unalterable ~~, but as
to be a priori only insofar as thinking without the positing of categories and of concepts in general
would be as impossible as is breathing in a vacuum. "®Never1heless, the hermetic separation of the
® Einstein. A. “Au|obIog7aphiI:a.l Mm", In Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ) Aum Eimlein —Ph.1mphe, and Scriemht. La s.-.11. (Illinois.
USA): Open Court, 1949 (first edition), 1!. 13.
® Einstein, n. “Remarks concenung the essays
(Illinois, usn); Open Court, 1949 (first edition), p. 574.
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two worlds coexists with their (ununderstandable) correlation; “ The very fact that the totality of our
sense experiences is such that by means of thinking
which leaves us in awe, but which we never shall understand.
is a miracle. "®
The Einsteinian formula ‘ incomprehensibility of the comprehensibility' goes hand in hand with
his view that the scientist’ s epistemological attitude is divided into strongly opposed parts; “ The
scientist
appears as a realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of perception; as
idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit
(not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his
concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of
relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platortist or Pythagorean insofar as he
gynsiders the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research. "
Second, Eugene P. Wigner:
“
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of
mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither
understand nor deserve, "C
Third, Richard P. Feynman; “I think, it is safe to say, that no one understands quantum
mechanics. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you possibly can avoid it,
"
But how can it be like
that? “ because you will go" down the drain “ into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped.
Nobody can know how it can be like that".®
Fourth, Roger Penrose; “I should begin by expressing my general attitude to present day
quantum theory, by which I mean standard, non - relativistic quantum mechanics. The theory has,
indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. First, in its favour
are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with every experimental result to date.
Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of astonishing and profound mathematical
beauty. The one thing that can be said against it is that it makes absolutely no sense ! "@
These quotations might be interpreted as the opinion of some individuals who cannot claim to
@ Einstein, “A. Physics and Reality". Jormwl ofThe rm..uu.1..s..2me, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U. 5. . 1935, 221.3, p. 351.
(5) 1:...s.e..., A. “Re......ks concerning the essays
(Illinois, USA): Open Coun. 1949 (first e.1.e.....», p. 684.
® w.g.e., E. P. “The Lnrcusonablc Eereenivehess or Mathematics 1.. the Natural sciences". Commimizmtiolu .2. Pm and Applizd
Marlmmxtim, New York: John wuey &— Sons, 1.... , 1950, vol. 13, No.1, last pangapli. Also accessible on -1...e. for instance, at www.
d..n........h. edu/ - matc/MsIhDramu/reading/Wigner. h....1. Wigjier is a major figure 1.. the development of q........... theory .1........ the 30‘ s, 40'
. and so ' s of the 20*“ century.
(3 Feynman, R. 17. , The Chat-uctero/"Ph<,‘s[4:uI law. Cambridge. MA, MIT Mass, 1967, p. 129. Feynman 1: a major figure in the
development of quantum theory during the 40' s, 50' s and 50‘ s of the 20" century.
® Penmse, R. Gravity and State Vector Reduction, in; R, i>e......e and C..l.lshu111 (eds. ), owns... Corwtpu 2.. Span and Time;
01414-rd: Clarendon Press, 1935, ... 129. Peurose is a major r.«,,u..e in the development of mat.hemat.ical tools .h quantum shd relativity theory
am... the 70' s and so‘ s of the 20* century.
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represent the stance of the majority of physicists. But, as a matter of fact, none of these Views has
been convincingly contradicted.
The trend of applying Mathematics to many fields of human knowledge is ever increasing.
Therefore, the use of axiomatics, hypothetical deduction and universal propositions occupies more
and more space besides the rationality proper of that field before the advenience of mathematical
tools. The case par excellence is Physics, where evidences and inductive reasoning, which allows
for contingency and exceptions, are increasingly marginalized. Besides, the common use of the
expression 7 applying Mathematics‘ and similar ones is even a sign for a process of replacing the
original rationality of experience. The reason is that it implicitly denies that mathematical objects or
structures originate in some way in the objects they are 7 applied to‘.
Applying Mathematics to physical problems is really an art of its own. But it has its limits,
because there is always an element of trial and error in connection with a particular problem. This
situation in turn suggests to distinguish between a purely theoretical and a practical knowledge of the
link between mathematical objects and structures and material things. The theoretical knowledge
answers to the question ‘.7 why?
‘
and is missing, at least for the time being. The practical
knowledge answers to the question 7 how to use? “ and is highly developed.
Even more: as the history of Physics since Newton‘ s times shows, the solidity of theoretical
Physics with its wealth of ideas furnished by the clear — cut mathematical rationality has led to the
conviction that Mathematics is more than a useful tool in Physics. One testimony might be
sufficient;
“Although Mathematics and Physics have grown apart in this century, Physics has continued to
stimulate mathematical research. Partially because of this, the influence of Physics on Mathematics
is well understood. However, the contributions of Mathematics to Physics are not as well
understood. It is a common fallacy to suppose that Mathematics is important for Physics only
because it is a useful tool for making computations. Actually, Mathematics plays a more subtle role
which in the long run is more important. When a successful mathematical model is created for a
physical phenomenon, that is, a model which can be used for accurate computations and
predictions, the mathematical structure of the model itself provides a new way of thinking about the
phenomenon. Put slightly differently, when a model is successful it is natural to think of the
physical quantities in terms of the mathematical objects which represent them and to interpret similar
or secondary phenomena in terms of the same model. Because of this, an investigation of the
internal mathematical structure of the model can alter and enlarge our understanding of the physical
phenomenon. Of course, the outstanding example of this is Newtonian mechanics which provided
such a clear and coherent picture of celestial motions that it was used to interpret practically all
physical phenomena. The model itself became central to an understanding of the physical world and
it was difficult to give it up in the late nineteenth century, even in the face of contradictory
evidence. A more modern example of this influence of Mathematics on Physics is the use of group
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theory to classify elementary particles. "@
This conviction, in turn, has paved the way for making a decisive step. So far, the
relationship between mathematical objects and material things has been something outside the focus
of attention. Measurements and, more generally, experiments, have been considered as bridges
between material things and mathematical theories. Bridges are not part of either side; but rather a
sort of third entity that connects both sides. Nevertheless, until the advenience of quantum physics
the bridges had been practically neglected.
But when the experimental process received its due attention, it could not be denied that the
known physico — mathematical theories must be considered incomplete, because they do not describe
the experimental process. But without any doubt, the experimental process is as natural as any other
natural process, and this confronts physicists with the choice of (a) acknowledge this sort of
incompleteness without reacting to it, for the time being, or trying to absorb the bridge into one of
the two sides; either nature or theory. This latter alternative can be put as (b) trying to think the
mathematical theory starting from material things with their own rationality, or (c) trying to think
material things starting from a mathematical theory with its own rationality.
Option (b) has not received any attention, while option (c) has been given considerable
attention in the field of the foundations of Physics, for the last 50 years. Option (a) continues
being dominant in mainstream Physics. Option (iii) is suitably called 7 the theory of measurement
“. The following quotation is taken from the first monograph on the quantum theory of
measurement.
“ We shall hope to have established a systematic description of the quantum mechanical
measurement process together with a concise formulation of the measurement problem. In our view
the generalized mathematical and conceptual framework of quantum mechanics referred to above
allows for the first time for a proper formulation of many aspects of the measurement problem within
this theory, thereby opening up new options for its solution. Thus it has become evident that these
questions, which were sometimes considered to belong to the realm of philosophical contemplation,
have assumed the status of well — defined and tractable physical problems". ®
To the date, the results of this attempt have not been satisfactory. Besides mathematical
difficulties that seem to be almost unsurmountable, the idea of a theory of measurement has split up
(9 Reed, M. /Simon, 3., Method: ufMadern. Mathenuxlical rams, mi. 1. New vmk. San Francisco, London; Academic mete,
1972. p. ix.
® Busch. P. , Lahu, P. 1., Vlitt/elstaedt, P. 17.. Quantum 17.295’ ofMeasiuwmen«t. Berlin. Heidelberg, New York; Spmlger —
Verlag, 21996, Preface, p.]X. Italics am the authors.
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into different approaches that are quite different from each other®. But there are no signs yet that
this option is going to be abandoned. This fact in turn might be interpreted as a sign that the spirit
of mathematization has grown too strong. The same basic idea might be read off from some words of
the influential mathematician D. Hilbert ( 1862 - 1943 ) : “ It is Mathematics which is the
instrument that offers the connection between theory and practice, between thinking and observing.
Mathematics is the connecting bridge and yields it stronger and stronger. This is why our present
culture, insofar it concerns the intellectual comprehension and use of nature, has its basis in
Mathematics. "®
Concluding we might say that one can hardly avoid the impression that the rationality
characteristic for Mathematics is marginalizing and trying to replace the rationality typical for the
material world. But this easily can bring about the situation that, in practice, theoretical ignorance
of the relationship to nature of mathematical laws of nature advances towards a systematic place in
Physics.
The difficulties within option (c) suggest to have a closer look at option (b) . Before doing so,
it is appropriate to ask whether physical science must be necessarily the Physics we are witnessing
today. In fact, there are some factors located in the scientific revolution, which have fostered the
historical development of Physics into a certain direction. But precisely by doing so they have
created other problems. To show this is the purpose of the following three sections.
]]I. Three pivotal ideas I ; “Nature and human cognitive capacities do not
fit together. ”
The purpose of this section is to make explicit the strong epistemological skepticism in
philosophy since the times of the scientific revolution. It was inevitable that this had, on the long
run, an equally strong impact on the emerging modern natural sciences. The quotations of renowned
physicists at the beginning of the previous section can serve as a sample of that impact. We confine
ourselves to a little anthology of quotations from influential philosophers from the beginning of the
modern era until present time.
R. Descartes (1596 -1650) wished to achieve above all certainty of his knowledge. To this
end he introduced a methodological doubt onto everything, in order to accept only what escapes this
a; rheie me several positimis in competition Vfllhliul that comprehensive presentations oi even recollclliaiimls hemeeii them sie at sight.
The llIBl|l positions esn be ui'IEli'lc|el11Ed by the touowiiig key words: opemiioiisiisni (theory or messiiieiiieni), hidden vanable theories.
Copenhagen inteipretation, many Morldn‘, m.iny minds, consistent iliswlles. modal interpretations, quantum logic, Bohm - iie Bmglie
inteipiet.-iiioii. Spolllanemls collapse, d:EDl’\el€|lc:. — An Dverview or the physical pmblernulics can he roiinei, rot instance, in niiseh, P. The
Qtiiintittn rheor, ofmetintietneni. Benin, Heidelberg, New voiit, Springer, zooz. A tiestnient or the philosophical iiioitienis (If the qiiiniiini
theory otiiieisiisement is oseit-ii in Miiteistsedi, P. Piiisies and Philasopfgn rite Ititeiisietiiti-tin If oininnin Mmhflflicl iuni the Meamltmeru
Process. Cambridge; Cambndge Lllivelsity nets, 1998. Similarly Bub, J. Interpreting the Quantum World. ciitnitnitge, Caml.)I'|dge University
Piess, 1997,
Q2 Hilben, D. Nannerkenneri iinii lnyk, Die Nstiimissensehstteii 18 (1930), s. 959 -963. The nsnsistion is mine.
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doubt and thus can serve as a starting point of a rational reconstruction of all other knowledge; “I
had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if
above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain , as has been already said; but as I
then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth , I thought that a procedure exactly
the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to
which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there
remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. "03
The methodical doubt includes also sense perceptions; “When I said that the entire testimony of
the senses should be regarded as uncertain and even as false, I was entirely serious. This point is
essential for a grasp of my Meditations—so much so that anyone who won’ t or can’ t accept it won’
t be able to come up with any objections that deserve a reply. "37 The methodical doubt prevails
truth and is not imposed by reality, but by the philosopher, who transforms himself voluntarily into
a rationalist.
B. Spinoza (1632 -1677) is one of those who seem to attach a sort of darkness to reality by
saying that things are
“
mute "03, so that ‘ true’ and ‘ false’ can be referred to real things only in a
metaphorical way. This is why he defends a rational reconstruction of a world view:
“
more
geometrico demonstrata" . that is to say, in a mathematical fashion@. Spinoza’ s fundamental idea
is that the logical order of thoughts is the same as the order of the corresponding realities.
I. Kant (1724 - 1804) went beyond Descartes by introducing what he viewed as a Copernican
turn. Knowledge depends only on the human observer, not on reality: “Although all our knowledge
begins with experience, that doesn’t mean that it all comes from experience. "@According to this
view, the senses do not have any influence on shaping concepts by the mind. Fhther, the mind
creates spontaneously, while guided by is own a priori' s, concepts and propositions.
The essentials of the kantian view continue being wide spread among physicists. To see this, it
is sufficient to observe that theoretical physicists are giving, by and large, mathematical names to
physical objects. This corresponds to what Kant expresses thus; ” The order and regularity in
appearances, which we call Nature, are put there by ourselves. We could never find them in
Q3 Descartes, 1a.. Discourse on the method; 4'" chapter. beginning. llllpg//WWW. earlymoderutextw‘. com/pdf/descdisc. par. ed.
Jonathan Bennett. Accessed 2012 —o9 — 15. Italics are mine.
@ Descartes, 11.. Ubjedions to the Meditations on are Philosophy and Replies. mi. set of objections (Cvassendi ;. reply to an
objection to the second meditation. hltp;//WWW. earlymodemtexus. com/pdflnts/desco5. pdi. ed. Jonathan Bennett. Accessed 2012 —o9 — 15.
Italics are mine,
(3 Spinoza, B. Cugimtn rvwtaphysica. Benedict! dc Spinoza open quot/quot repena sum, Vol. 1v, 1.5. Den Haag; M. mjnoa. 1914.
p. mm; the expression “res mntss" is on n. ma.
® Two orsp1non.' s pnncial weir: are "Reuah Des Canes Priucipiorum Philosophies pars 1 et 11 more geometries demonstrate.
Accesselunl eiusdem Cogitata Metaphysics" (Amsterdam. 1663). . and “Ethics ordule geometriw demonst.mta" (1675).
® Kant. 1. Cntlqueo/pure Reason (second edition. 1737). p. 1. www. earlymodemtrzxts. cum/pd!‘/kanl/cprl. pa: (ed. lonntllau
Bennett). Accessed 2012 -09 -15.
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appearances if it weren’t that we, or the nature of our mind, had first put them there. "® Even
though it might seem counterintuitive, the understanding isnl t a mere power of formulating rules
through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of Nature, It‘ s only through the
understanding t.hat Nature exists at all!
appearances according to rules. And appearances can't exist outside us—they exist only in our
sensibility. Thus, Nature
contemporary expression. our experience is considered as theory — laden.
As well as in the views of Descartes and Spinoza, also in Kant’ s Copernican turn the
communication between different humjan subjects becomes dependent on reconstruction. Thence the
probem of
‘
private languages’ arises; is it possible to give an account of private languages of
different humans in the private language of one of them? In Physics, this problem can be appa.rently
circumvented by advocating the universality of Mathematics.
B. Russell (1872 — 1970) offered another variety of arguing for the need of a rational




We all start from
'
na‘? ve
realism‘ , i. e. the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that
stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the
hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that
we know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to
himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the
stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it most means to be
objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. Na? ve realism leads to physics,
and physics, if tme, shows that na? ve realism is false. Therefore na’! ve realism, if true, is
false; therefore it is false. And therefore the behaviourist, when he thinks he is recording
observations about the outer world, is really recording observations about what is happening
in him. "@
K. Popper (1902 — 1994) is considered as the most influential author in 20‘l‘ century —
philosphy of science. His writings bear clearly a Kantian influence. This can be seen in that Popper
defines in the final section of his first and most important book “ The Logic of Scientific Discovery"
( 1935) the thesis of the experimenting scientist‘ s relationship to reality as theory laden experience;
“Even the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired by ideas;
experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by theory. We do not stumble upon our
experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream. Rather, we have to be active; we have
to ‘ make’ our experiences. It is we who always formulate the questions to be put to nature; it is we
who try again and again to put these questions so as to elicit a clear — cut ‘ yes’ or ‘ no’ (for nature
<13 1:»... 1. Cntlqu/so/pm: Recuon. (am edition, 1731), P. 125. www. earlymodemtrxts. com/pdf/kantcprl. pd.f (ed. Jonathan
Bennett). Accessed 2012 -09 -15.
<13 1121.1. . p. 127. Accessed 2012 —o9 — 15.
@ Russell, E. An Inquiry inm Meaning and Tm}-. Hanlmndswnflhz Penguin Books, 1966 (seventh edition), p. 13.
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does not give an answer unless pressed for it). And in the end, it is again we who give the answer,
it is we ourselves who, after severe scrutiny, decide upon the answer to the question we put to
nature. "3
W. Stegmuller (1923 -1991) is one of the many who echoes Popper:
“
Even though people
are nowadays quite ready to acknowledge that we are lacking a thorough understanding of the
phenomena of science and scientific progress, they mostly take it for granted that such a progress is a
fact. But this too has no support at all. A? priori, it cannot be expected at all that we achieve
acceptable theories about the world. To A. ‘? Einstein is attributed the statement that it belongs to
the most ununderstandahle things of this world that the world is, for us, understandable. And we
could add that this being understandable is a very limited and etemally problematic issue. ‘ Our lack
of knowledge is without limits and capable of making us understand what we are. Alas, it is
precisely the overwhelming progress of the natural sciences?. . . , which opens our eyes again and
again towards our lack of knowledge’ . W3
In conclusion: In philosophy there is a broad, dominant and long tradition of the View that
nature and human cognitive capacities do not fit together. However, this intellectual climate has not
led to renouncing of investigation and communication. Instead, there have been offered a huge
variety of attempts to substitute the supposed lack of intelligibility connected with the luminous and
unifying source of experience by some other individualistic rationality.
IV. Three pivotal ideas ll;
“
Most Present day ways of understanding
Mathematics are unrelated to the material World.
”
The sellunderstanding of Mathematics is dealt with by mathematicians as well as by
philosophers, even though with different points of emphasis. While mathematicians focus, by and
large, more on foundational issues of Mathematics, philosophers deal preferably with metaphysical
and epistemological questions related to mathematical objects and mathematical knowledge,
respectively. Nevertheless, both approaches overlap largely®.
The View of Mathematics prima facie most attractive is the platonistic one. That is to say, that
mathematicians refer to abstract entities which exist independently from the mathematician ' s mind.
These entities just have to be discovered, rwt invented, notwithstanding any axiomatization of
Mathematics. C. Frege (1848 -1925) and K. C? del (1906 -1978) had views of this kind.
@ Popper, Karl 11. the Logic of seienti e umtety. Iatldnn; I'IulcI1ilI50|I st Co., 1959 (first edition); Lmldun; Routlcdge
(Routledge Classics), 2002 (third edition). The English version of that pm is unaltered with respect to the German version nr193s.
@ Steyniiller, W. Pmblerrlc urld Rerultate tier Wisxerlschqfislhzorie Inld eentlmterten Philoruphie, Bd. 11,1 Theorie ntld Erfahmllg.
Berlin, Heidelberg, New Yotk; spnnget - Verlag, 1974, s. 472. me inner quotauoll is from: Pnmtet, K. 11., " Die rttgk det
seti.1wieee..eeh.tten". in: 1-1. Maui ttna F. Fu1atenhcrg(ccl.). So'I:lologis1:heTexte, Bd. 53, Neuwled/Berlin, 1959, s. 1031 Thetranslatloll
is mine.
a For this whole Seclmll has been consulted, above .-.11, the entry ~1>1t.1neep1t, oi ,11.the...ettet" (VHSIOII 2.5.2012) of the stenieni
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (abbreviated: s1:1>, http://plato.sta11find.edu/) tttti related entries.
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Nevertheless, the three presently relevant views of Mathematics originated in the beginning of
the 20"‘ century and are anti - platonistic: the logicistic approach attempts a foundation of
Mathematics by reducing it to logics. It is linked to Frege and B. Russell (1872 — 1970) and is
practically abandoned. The intuitionist approach is linked to L. E. J. Brouwer (1881 -1966). He
considers the whole of Mathematics as a mental construction in the strictest sense of the word;
mathematical objects are only those that have been effectively constructed; Brower rejects
mathematical objects whose existence is only assured by a proof of the absurdity of its nonexistence.
Such non — constructive proofs of existence have the form; “if there were not an x satisfying P, then
we would arrive to a contradiction, hence there is an X satisfying P", He observes that such
undesired proofs rest on the logical Boolean axiom that the negation of ti negation of it true
proposition is true which, in turn, is linked to the principle of excluded middle [for any
proposition; either p is true or non — p is true]. The intuitionist approach is not used in current
mathematics.
The presently dominant view among mathematicians is the formalistic approach, which is
linked to D. Hilbert (1862 — 1943). It tries to understand Mathematics as a web of formal
systems, without reference to any abstract entities. Nevertheless, the natural numbers, whose name
suggests some proximity to the physical world, are thought to play a basic role within Mathematics.
All anti — platonistic views rest decisively upon axiomatics.
As the views mentioned in the previous paragraph present themselves as rather independent
from the physical world, the undeniable success of Mathematics in natural sciences, above all
Physics, remains ununderstood. There are, however, also attempts to account for that fact. In this
case, not all of Mathematics appears to be linked to the material world. Therefore, accounts of such
a link are not necessarily a foundation of Mathematics as a whole. Nevertheless, the multiple
internal connections within Mathematics make it difficult to draw a distinction between pans of
Mathematics relevant for Physics and others that are irrelevant (at present).
One attempt to understand the link between Mathematics and the physical world goes back to
Aristotle. He opposes the platonic View of two separated worlds — the hierachically ordered ideas,
from which the individuals of the material world participate in one or other way. According to
Aristotle, each material individual has — so to speak — incoporated its own idea or ‘ substantial
fonn’ , as he calls it.




















‘ as separated’ (hos kekhérismenan) ,
‘ qua’ or ' in the respect that’ (héi) , and
‘intelligible matter’ (noétiké hylé)®. The first five concepts indicate that the status of
mathematical objects is something secondary, derived or otherwise dependent or incomplete.
However, the concept ‘intelligible matter’ is less obvious. And, importantly, all concepts indicate
@ Principal sources are the Posterior Analytic, De Anima 1.1.5 4, Metaphysics 11.. 2, .1. 1, VII. 10 — 11 , 1‘. 9, x. 1 —2, xi. 2 —3.
7,1:-.1.1—3, ppm 11.2. (ct. srr, ent-ry “Aristotle and Matherrrat-ics" (versioIr2;6.3.2DO4),7.
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that mathematical objects do not exist outside the mathematician‘ s mind‘
Another attempt of understanding the link between Mathematics and the physical world has
been proposed by W. V. 0. Quine (1908 -2000) and H4 Putnam (1926 — ) and has become
known as (methodological) m2turali.sm[@]. It consists in renouncing of traditional metaphysical
and epistemological thinking and instead consider as basic the currently best scientific theories , that
is to say, the currently most successful ones. They express what exists. what we know and the way
how we know it. To this naturalistic View has to be added Quine' s thesis of confirrntutional holism;
scientific experience globally confirms a theory as a whole, together with its methedological
ingredients. As physical theories are formulated in mathematical terms, through which entire
mathematical theories are linked to it, these latter are also confirmed by experience.
Quine goes beyond this. “ It seems that mathematics is indispensable to our best scientific
theories; it is not at all obvious how we could express them without using mathematical vocabulary.
Hence the naturalist stance commands us to accept mathematical entities as part of our philosophical
ontology. This line of argumentation is called an indispensability argurr1ent7"®.
Still another attempt to understand Mathematics is called Fictiomzlism. lt is not only opposed to
mathematical Platonism, but also to Aristotle’ s view of mathematical objects as derived and thus
dependent from real beings. “Fictionalism holds that mathematical theories are like fiction stories
such as fairy tales and novels. Mathematical theories describe fictional entities, in the same way
that literary fiction describes fictional characters. "@ Or in more concise terms: “ Fictionalism
the view that ( A) our mathematical sentences and theories do purport to be about abstract
mathematical objects, as platonism suggests, but (B) there are no such things as abstract objects,
and so (C) our mathematical theories are not true. "@
With respect to a link of mathematical entities to the physical world, provided they are
considered as fictional, it must be concluded that ‘,7 scientific theories, in particular physical
theories, should be derived, at least in principle, without using Mathematics at all'?. Otherwise
mathematical theories considered as fictional would appear to be indispensable for Physics. This in
turn is at odds with their supposed fictional character. Comparing this with Einstein’ s stance as
mentioned in section II, it remains open whether Einstein would consider Mathematics as
indispensable for Physics.
In conclusion; Fictionalism and the current anti — platonistic accounts of Mathematics have no
roots in the physical world, except (perhaps) Arillimetics. On the other hand, the aristotelian view
of mathematical objects is based on the pelceptional knowledge of the physical world‘ Both the
aristotelian and the fictionalist View are opposed to mathematical Platonism insofar mathematical
objects exist only in the scientist‘ s mind. The naturalistic View proposed by Quine is foremost
@ cf. snr, entry "Vaturallsm in the Philosophy or Mathematics" (Version 1.112003), 2.
® SEP. entry “Philosophy nfMaLhen1atics" (version 2.5.2012) . 3. 2 Naturalism and Indispensahilily
@ SEP, entry *1>1n1ooop1ry or Mathematics" (version 2.5.2012) , 4. 5 Fictmnalism
@ s121>, entry “rinnnnnlisrn in the Philosophy of Mathematics" (version 16.9.2011), 1.1.
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characterized by putting scientific theories and not philosophical ones as a foundation of our
knowledge. Additional principles, namely that of confirmational holism and the indispensability
argument, are needed in order to give Mathematics an overall link to the physical world.
The situation is unsatisfactory, because even the aristotelian and the naturalistic view offer only
an utmost generic account of the link between Mathematics and the material world. Given the
overwhelming success of mathematical theories in Physics, the most satisfactory rationale would be
to have a view that certain mathematical objects and structures are something endogene from
precisely those material things the behaviour of which they refer to. This would radically eliminate
the problem of ‘why mathematics is applicable to nature‘ , as if mathematics were something
exogene to nature.
V. Three pivotal ideas ]]I;
“
The mathernatization of Physics is an
essential part of the scientific revolution.
"
The term ‘ scientific revolution’ is nowadays commonly used to characterize the historical
period in which the medieval philosophy of nature has undergone a metmrwrphosis to yield natural
sciences as we know them today. This period’ s beginning is commonly marked by the publication of
Nicolaus Copernicus’ (1473 — 154-3) opus magnum called
“
De revolutionihus orbium coelestium"
in 1543, where he proposes heliocentrism instead of geocentrism. But there are more major
changes, which involve also basic philosophical ideas such as ‘ cause’ and ‘ order’. A certain
completion was reached with I. Newton (1642 — 1727) , whose opus magnum carries the title
“Philosophiae Naturalis Mathematica Principia". Later major changes within natural sciences such
as the transition from classical Physics to Relativity and Quantum Physics or the birth of modern
Microbiology are sometimes also called ‘ revolutionary’ , but they are by far not so deep as the
metamorphosis that took place during the roughly 200 years from Copernicus to Newton.
Within Physics, outstanding changes during that revolutionary period include first the
replacement of impetus (inbuilt momentum) by inertia (resistence to exterior forces) , and second
the overcoming of the world’ s division into a terrestiial and a celestial region in virtue of universal
gravitation, which in turn is linked to the overcoming of the division into light and heavy bodies
according to their natural motion. These changes refer to Mechanics and Astronomy. Major changes
occurred also in Optics, Chemistry and Medicine.
With respect to properly scientific issues, the scientific revolution is a huge web of many
discoveries and developments. They are accompanied, even made possible, by only a few, but deep
philosophical changes. One of them is the replacement of causes by laws of nature. The classical
view was that of a bundle of four interconnected causes, introduced by Aristotle. Two of them were
intrinsic (or constitutive) causes of a material thing, namely form and matter, and two of them were
extrinsic causes, namely efficient and final cause. In the course of the scientific revolution, the
final cause was dropped altogether, the eflicient cause became the most important, and the material
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and fonnal cause were replaced by something more or less unified and gave rise to an atomistic view
of material things.
Again, the prominence of efficient causes favoured the importance of experiments. Among
these, measurements became particularly important, because they gave way to abstract laws of
nature, In Physics and Astronomy, laws of nature could most conveniently be formulated in
mathematical terms, such that Galilei (1564 — 1642) could say that the book of nature “ is written
in mathematical letters "®. Mathematical laws of nature, in turn, allow for calculability, predicitons
and hence technology.
As a consequence of the profound changes in philosophy of nature and scientific knowledge,
there was a profound change of how the human person as a whole related to the nature he or she was
living in. The historian of science A. Koyré is one of the first in using deliberately the word
‘revolution’ , when he says, for instance;
“
deepest, mutations and transformations accomplished — or suffered — by the human mind since the
invention of the cosmos by the Greeks, two thousand years before.
"
® In other words, such an
increasing dominium of nature caused a transition from a sort of contemplative life ( vita
contemplation) to an active life (vita activa)®.
Koyre pinpoints the significance of the scientific revolution for the mindset of mankind by
giving two characteristics; “(a) the destruction of the cosmos, and therefore the disappearance
from science
nearly equivalent to the mathematization ( geometrization ) of nature and therefore the
mathematization ( geometrization) of science. The disappearance - or destruction - of the cosmos
means that the world of science, the real world, is no more seen, or conceived, as a finite and
hierarchically ordered, therefore qualitatively and ontologically differentiated, whole, but as an
open, indefinite, and even infinite universe, united not by its immanent structure but only by the
identity of its fundamental contents and laws.
violent expulsion - from scientific thought of all conderations based on value, perfection,
harmony , meaning, and aim, because these concepts, from now on merely subjective, cannot have a
place in the new ontology. "3
Thus there are good reasons to think that the mathematization of Physics has been the most
important single factor in bringing about the scientific revolutiong. On the one hand, the “silence"
@ cnlileo Galilei, I1 Sagglawve (The An.-iyei, 1623), inneleueol by Stillman make (1957) in DiSE47I)€7i£! and Upiliions iycolizco,
pp. 237 — 233.
® Koyre. A. Newlonmn Smdiu, p. zrr. , Cambndge, Muss. ; Harvard University Press, 1965, p.5. Cf. also Koyré, A. “Galileo
and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century", Phxzowphizot Rwiew 52 (1943) , 333 -346.
® cf. Koyie, A. Newwninn Slluilitl, Caxnbnclge, Mus. ; Harvard University Press, 1955, p. 5.
® ibx , , p.6 -7
43 Ct. the monumental oeinne or 1:. J. Dnkneihnn, The Mech4uIizAuion o/ihc World Picnne (lnndoiig Oxfold University Pieee, 1951
[Repnnn The Mechnnizonon aflhe World Picture. The Scientific Revolution; A Hncniogrophicol Inquiry. Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1994] , which gives to understand that above ininy continuities and discontinuities “IE only ieil break brought about by the scientific Ievolutloll
win the work of the Archimedean Llalilea and by Kepler, the Platonisr and Pylhagmeaii-thefirsl two in-cnn-ni truly to rruuherrlatue nature.
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of nature most certainly has influenced the view that Mathematics is by itself unrelated to nature. On
the other hand, the experimental findings have contributed to giving the mathematization of nature
its role as a source of rationality and of consequences in practice (technology) and in mindset
(dominium of nature). But the mathematization has also raised philosophical questions concerning
the relationship between nature and the mathematical laws of nature, as has been sketched in
section I. These are questions of a theoretical understanding, part of which will be addressed in the
following section.
VI. Four problems in Physics raised by the scientific revolution
One question at the very root of the mathematization of our view of nature concerns the
experiment called
‘
measurement’; Everybody has leamed to perform simple measurements of
length, weight and time. Perhaps this very fact has made him or her forget to wonder about why it is
possible that two different things can be compared at all. Why is it that different measuring devices
applied to the same object yield approximately equal results? On the other hand , why are the results
of different performances of measuring the same object only approximately equal‘?
At t_his point, it must be noted that the formulations in the preceding paragraph depend on the
fact thatthe human obser ver/experimenter fits into his measurement as a macroscopic body.
Therefore, descriptions like ‘ long’ ,
‘ short‘ , heavy‘ , light’ , fast’ ,
‘ slow ’ and the like are
made in relation to macroscopic units. But there is a qualitative difference between the macroscopic
and the microscopic realm. For instance, while the diameter of a macroscopic sphere can be
measured by other macroscopic devices, nobody has ever verified that an elementary particle, e. g.
an electron , has a geometrical shape, let alone has measured it, Only by hypothetical assumptions
and extrapolations from the macroscopic world a physicist might give an electron such geometrical
properties,
In other words, the practice of Physics contradicts its theoretical view; on the one hand, the
generally accepted theoretical View is that elementary particles and atoms are more fundamental than
solid bodies in the sense that solid bodies “consist" somehow of elementary particles. This means
that the properties of macroscopic things should be traced back to the properties of their microscopic
constituents. In fact, the task of solid state Physics is, above all, to link properties of macroscopic
bodies to properties of microscopic ones.
But on the other hand, it is a fact that the experimenter is a macroscopic entity and must use
macroscopic instruments. This has led to the situation that the properties of a microscopic body are
defined in terms of properties of macroscopic instruments. But as these macroscopic instruments
themselves consist of microscopic things, their properties should be defined by the properties of their
microscopic constituents. If this would be done by using the same procedure, i. e. taking the
properties of the microscopic constituents of an instrument as defined by properties of other
macroscopic bodies, the result would be a regress ad infinitum. Thus there is a need of defining the
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properties of a microscopic body by means of properties of other microscopic bodies which, in turn,
are defined by means of properties of other microscopic bodies. This has not been done so far.
Indeed, consistently carrying through this idea would amount to is major internal reform of Physics.
One might well object that this enterprise is almost impossible, and that it is not clear how much
benefit Physics would gain from it. But such objections “a priori" can hardly be proved.
A second problem arises from the fact that in mathematical laws of nature, the description of
behaviour is dissociated from the reference to the individuals, the behaviour of which they describe.
Rather, the connection of a law with “its" individuals is exclusively a performance within the
experimental physicist.
Truly, predictability and its consequences, above all technology, have been achieved by
mathematical laws of nature. But this has been achieved by at the expenses of intrinsic reference of
a law to “ its
"
individuals. Obviously, this is a characteristic of the imperfect interlocking of
mathematics and nature referred to in section I. And it makes it more easy to understand that the
mathematical laws of nature are not obtained by a sort of derivation starting from observational or
experimental data. Rather they are hypthetically conceived and then in a procedure of trial and error
“applied" to material things.
One might well object that the universality of a law of nature cannot be achieved otherwise than
by a loss of intrinsic reference to individuals. Even more; that a law of nature refers intrinsically to
a particular individual can hardly mean anything else than that this law of nature is completely
confined to that particular individual. It seems that we find ourselves before the choice llack of
reference & universality’; versus {incorporated reference & no universalityl . But again, this is not
proved. Rather one could argue that true laws of nature should be more comprehensive by
incorporating individuality as well as universality. Mathematical structures are only part of such a
comprehensive law of nature.
A third problem is related to the twosidedness of every measuring process referred to in the
beginning of this section. Measurements are based upon the action of the measuring object on the
measuring device. But the device — though being an artifact of natural things — is not less a thing
of nature than the measuring object. In rigor, then, we have to speak of an interaction of both sides
of an experiment. But then, what have we to make with the following words of W. Heisenberg
(1901 — 1976) ;
“Truly, our accustomed description of nature and in particular the idea that processes in nature
follow strict laws are based upon the assumption that it is possible to observe phenomena without
exercising an rwtable influerwe on them. To attribute a certain cause to a certain effect makes sense
only if we can observe effect and cause without intervening at the same time in the process
perturbing it. "®But; " By means of the intervention necessary for the experiment we destroy certain
® Herseiiberg. W. Physilmtixche mm-pzen dev ommmmnk (warm. 1929/30>. Brblmgzaphisches Insmut, Mannheim. 195x, IV.
3. (Tmlulmon and italics are mine. )
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connections that are characteristic for the microscopic world. "C3
Another prominent text of Einstein — Podolsky — Rosen highlights the same idea; “Any serious
consideration of a physical theory must take into account the distinction between the objective
reality, which is independent of any theory, and the physical concepts with which the theory
operates. . . . Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory.
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical
reality corresponding to this physical quantity. " (Italics by the authors. )3
Even though these formulations have been made many decades ago, they do influence the
present day view of most physicists; experiments are unilateral in the sense that experimental
devices are expected to yield information about the experimental object, but not vice versa. But
physicists learned in the context of quantum physics that they both do interact. Thus the question
arises of what hinders to draw the consequence and treat both side equally?
A fourth problem comes from the temporal limitations imposed on experiments In practice, all
experiments are cut out from their environment by boundaries in time. This seems very reasonable,
because the experimenter wishes to obtain results in finite time. But does a temporal limitation
correspond , in rigor, to something in nature? is it not plausible that limitations of that kind, which
are considered to yield simplifications and practicability, on the long run rather import problems? A
similar question could be formulated with respect to spatial limitations,
Summing up we can say that the scientific revolution has brought great achievements in
Physics. But it has also introduced new problems into Physics. The most serious ones are, to my
mind, the four aforementioned: (1) To the date, the macroscopic realm is not fully characterized
by means of the microscopic one. Current solid state Physics relies on the idea that macroscopic
bodies are built up by bodies of the microscopic realm. But as has been said, the properties of
microscopic bodies are characterized by the properties of macroscopic instruments. But as these
instruments, too, are build up by microscopic constituents, their properties need a characterization
by microscopic things without the mediation of macroscopic bodies. Otherwise, a regress ad
infinitum is unavoidable. This exceeds the possibilities of experimentation and, therefore, is a task
for a sort of Philosophy intimately connected with Physics. (2) Mathematical laws of nature, being
universal, do not contain the unrepeatahle features of the individual material things the behaviour of
which they are supposed to describe. Problem (3) concerns the profound conflict between two
antagonistic features of every experiment; on the one hand, it is a means for gaining information,
but on the other hand, it disturbs that information. Perhaps here must be found an appropriate
understanding of the activity and passivity of material things. The dynamics in turn is linked to
'3 Helsellbelg, w. Wiiniirmigai zii den Gfulldlagtrl .1”/vatiiii.ii;wiicr.ii,ri..i, Stultgafl: 5.7 Him] — Verlag, 1959 (nnlellt edition).
s. 103. (Ttflllilaimn and italics ii: mine. )
® Elnsttln, A. , roaiiiiky, 3., R035“, ‘I. , “cit. qullllllllt — llICBl1llIlCal tlesrrlplioll of physical reality be Cmlsltleied mipiem"
Pltylltfll Kim, 47 (1935), P. 777;.
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problem (4) which concerns the division of the world into limited space — time regions, to which
experiments are considered to be confined.
VII. Conclusion
Thus it turns out that the four problems sketched in the previous section are connected with
each other. In some sense, they form a chain, wherefore a renouncing of the spatio — temporal
limits of experiments (problem
point, one has to choose between two alternatives. Either one declares the success of unrefonned
Physics as satisfactory. Then Physics continues as until now with the inbuilt risk that the mentioned
four problems exercise an uncontrolled influence. Or one tackles the internal reform of mathematical
Physics in favour of its transparency and intemal consistency. This requires extremely much work,
but it might yield, on the long run, an even deeper success. In this latter case, the very success of
mathematical theories in Physics strongly suggests to combine the task of solving the four
aforementioned problems with the inquiry of why and how specific mathematical structures somehow
have their roots in material things. These two aims determine the following basics of a work
programme;
(or) Renounce of the spatial and temporal limitations of experiments and allow for unlimited
interaction of material things.
(y) Renounce of using any physico - mathematical theory at the beginning of the imernal
reform.
(6) Base your considerations exclusively on experience that is not theory — laden.
(8) Try to specify what could be called qualitatively the “reflective loop" referred to in the
previous section as problem
The view expressed here is innovative because this work programme pretends to achieve more
than presenting just a parallel philosophical view of nature which does not really interfere with how
physicists are exercising their profession. It also pretends more than to provide methodological
standards for physical investigation. If it succeeds, it could be called in all propriety an internal
reform of Physics.
*
Despite of its innovative character, the above work programme does not look promising. Things
might change to the better, when we go searching for philosophical forerunners. Such a
philosophical forerunner would have to meet two conditions. First, it must he experience - based.
In other words, experience is understood as a genuin source of knowledge. What is more, the gap
between particular perceptions and a universal theory requires an intelligible link, namely
inductwn. Additionally, such a forerunner should offer an account of the activity and passivity of
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material things. This condition dissuades from relying on rationalist philosophies.
The second condition concerns the singularity of material things. In order to account for the
interaction of individual material things, their singularity must necessarily be taken into account.
But it cannot be adequately expressed by using exclusively concepts or linguistic terms: Neither
universal concepts (for instance, the platonic 8ra’r.peo'L9) nor even demonstrative pronouns would
do it. The only linguistic means to refer precisely to this individual is by proper names. But while it
is possible to give proper names to macroscopic things, for instance volcanos, rivers or trees, it is
impossible to link proper names to single atoms or elementary particles. Therefore, the second
condition dissuades from relying on the analytic way of doing philosophyg‘. Beyond the limits of
language alone, one can refer to a material thing by pointing a finger at it. This requires sense
perception, sight in particular. But this procedure is simply impossible in the case of elementary
particles.
Does that mean that the proposed work programme aims at something impossible? As a matter
of fact, the hylomorphism proposed by Aristotle and, in a different framework, by Thomas Aquinas,
has a certain account of the singularity of material things. So the work programme can, perhaps,
make use of an already developed philosophical conceptuality. However, it is impossible to give an
appropriate account of this particular feature of hylomorphism in a few paragraphs.
It must be admitted that Aristotelian as well as Thomistic philosophy of nature are considered
outdated. One reason for that is that they have not made any pronouncements about what is an
experiment. Even less about the question what is a measurement. But both experiment and
measurement are essentials of modern Physics. My claim is that the metaphysical core of
Aristotelian - thomistic philosophy of nature is useful for answering t.hese questions. For the present
problem, the first relevant metaphysical notion is ‘ hylomorphism’. It refers to the constitution of
material things as members of species or agglomerations of such members. The second relevant piece
is the general principle called ‘ agere sequitur esse' . It expresses a sort of proportionality between
the dynamics of something and what it is. Thus, this principle can be claimed to offer a rationale for
how laws of nature do stem from the very things they refer to®.
VIII. Is there any specific contribution of Christianity to solving the
problem?
Let us anticipate the answer: Indeed, there is a specific contribution of Christianity to solve
that problem. But Christianity does not do so by making assertions that belong to the competence of
@ This does not mind. that the analytic approach can is» interesting views, an instance rm, E. J. The Four — Category Ontology.
A Metaphysical Fimmiatron /ur Natural Scierwe. Oxford, London, New York; Oxford University Press, 2006.
@ A detailed account nr the problems ruexrtrorred in section vii. together’ with the on Steps of this V«r)l‘l( pmgraru can be found in
Larerrz, R. “What can Thomrstrc Philosophy of Nature Contribute to Physics?" , in: Socretal Studies. mus ( Lithuania) s Mykolas Romeris
University, 2013(2), online WWW. mrunl. eu/en/mokslo_dalbai/sms/pask|IIiIris_nIImerrs/. Alteniative access via www. ceeol. com.
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professionals in Natural Sciences or Mathematics. Christianity contributes exclusively to a
philosophical issue by stating a positive view of the intelligibility of this world. Obviously, this view
is opposed to what has been said in section III. about the View of most modern philosophers.
The New Testament as well as the Old Testament make far reaching statements about the
intelligibility of this world. In particular, the Catholic Church is most explicit in linking both
objective intelligibility and subjective capacity of understanding together. She does so by stating that
it is possible that somebody reaches, without having any knowledge about Christianity, the insight
that the things of this world are what the Bible calls ‘ created’ and that they, therefore, have a
Creator®.
Nothing is said, in this context, about the intellectual path to be followed, not even whether
such an intellectual path has been, or will be, realized in history or the future. The statement is
confined to saying that the things of this world “ give an account" on their being created, and that
human mind is capable of understanding this language of reality. From the Catholic point of view,
Christian revelation is epistemologically “ optimistic". It follows that experience has a positive
cognitive value.
As the status ‘ created’ of a thing comprehends whatever belongs to it, no information about
this thing can be separated from the insight into its being created. In our context, the emphasis lies
on the following conclusion; given the premises (1) the behaviour of material things stems precisely
from those same things, (2) the knowledge of this behaviour, expressed in laws of nature, is
connected with the insight into the being created of those things, it follows that the search for laws of
nature profits from the intelligibility of the world and the cognitiie capacity of the human mind, at
least insofar as the laws of nature contribute to the knowledge of things as being created.
Therefore, a scientist who happens to be a Christian is, by his faith, enabled to an
“epistemological optimism". And exactly by this, a scientist who happens to be a Christian is
almost forbidden by his faith to base the particular propositions of his scientific discourse in any way
on this very same faith. He is exclusively relegated to his natural capacity of insight and reasoning.
For the sake of clarity, it should be added that the assertions of the Bible about single
historical facts such as the age of the universe, of the earth and of mankind or the extension and
dating of the flood are particular assertions. They should be evaluated in the light of the Bible’ s
universal affirmations about the intelligibility of this world and, perhaps, in the light of further
exegetical criteria. In this context, creationists easily give too much credit to present day natural
sciences, if they do not examine whether the epistemological climate in these sciences is compatible
with the epistemological climate generated and witnessed by Christian revelation.
True, Christian faith tells also, that sinfulness darken: the human mind and makes its activity
laborious, but it does not make it impossible. Therefore, scientific reasoning continues depending
exclusively on every scientist’ s own intellectual capacity and his or her professional training. A
® cf. Vatican Council 1, Uogmatir: Constitution 02.‘ rain; (u.4.1s70), Cllaptrrl, fl!!! paragaph. Unlme at “W. dist. o..¢e../
documentation/11 — Vat-icanCouneili. asp. Accessed 2012 -09 -15.
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scientist who happens to be a Christian possesses by his faith a guarantee that the thesis of the
intelligibility of the world and the cognitive capacity of the human mind is true. He or she has more
intellectual steadfastlwss in the laborious activity of investigating this world. Likewise, Cod‘ s grace
and a Christian’ s striving to follow Christ contribute to that same goal. But this interior strength
does not provide arguments which would be less accessible to non — believers, or not accessible
at all.
In conclusion, the statement “ there is no specifically Christian way of doing science" is
ambiguous. A scientist who happens to be a Christian, should not draw on the Christian revelation,
or on the Bible in particular, when making scientific propositions or proving them. Rather he should
exclusively focus on the object in question and use his human capacities of inquiry and rational
discourse, In that sense, the statement cited is true. But if it comes to the existence of truth at all,
which touches the very notion of science, or to the fundamental discernment between an
“epistemological optimistic (bright) or pessimistic (obscure) climate" , this statement is false.
The Christian way of doing science is embedded in an epistemologically bright or optimistic climate.
IX. Final Remark
The claim that the mathematization of Physics perfolmecl in the course of the scientific
revolution during the 16”" and 17"' centuries should be corrected is based on good reasons. It would
be a thorough internal refomi, almost a second scientific revolution. This is why it should not only
be judged by its success in showing why and how mathematical structures are rooted in material
things. It must also explain why the present mathematical Physics has been so successful, despite
the problems sketched in section Vi.
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